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I. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
THE RECORD DOES NOT REASONABLY SUPPORT THE 
CONCLUSION THAT MR. GREEN, IN EFFECT/ 
ABANDONED HIS JOB 
Begining at page 17 of its brief/ respondent Board of 
Review (sometimes hereinafter refered to as the Board) argues 
that the UTA's request that plaintiff James Green sign an 
"accident commitment" was a reasonable request which would have 
at least allowed him to preserve his employment while he looked 
for another job. Therefore- the Board's arguement goes; Mr. 
Green in effect abandoned his job despite the clear, 
uncontroverted evidence that he was told; "You're fired". (R.63) 
and then received a letter stating "effective immediately your 
employment . . . is terminated". (R.76) 
Characterization of the request as "reasonable" is 
dependant on a finding that Mr* Green was asked to sign a 
commitment not to have further preventable accidents for twelve 
months. As argued in Plaintiff's Opening Brief/ there is no 
evidence in the record to support a conclusion that Mr. Green was 
asked to sign a commitment not to be involved in a preventable 
accident. Instead/ the testimony offered at the administrative 
hearing was only to the effect that he was asked to commit to 
"not have any more accidents." (R.51) 
The difference is critical, By being asked to commit 
to "not have any more accidents"/ any control Mr. Green otherwise 
had over his own job security was eliminated. Had Mr. Green 
signed a commitment worded in the manner described by the UTA's 
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representative at the administrative hearing, he would have been 
subject to immediate termination had he been involved in any 
accident, whether one caused by an act of God or one resulting 
solely from another driver's negligence, such as would likely be 
the case were Mr. Green's bus rearended by another vehicle. Such 
a tenuous hold on his employment was understandably unacceptable 
to Mr. Green. 
At page 22 of its brief, the Board argues that the 
record as a whole supports the finding that Mr. Green was 
requested only to commit to having no preventable accidents. On 
the contrary, the most that can be said from review of the whole 
record is that it was apparantly the UTA's subjective intent that 
Mr. Green commit to no preventable accidents. Every objective 
manifestation to Mr. Green was that his only option to 
termination was to commit to not be involved in any more 
accidents. (R.51; 62; 63; 67; 69) 
The Board argues that the UTA's policy was to 
discipline drivers only for preventable accidents and thus the 
commitment Mr. Green was asked to make must have been with 
reference to preventable accidents. In so arguing, the Board 
forgets that when asked to commit in writing to no more 
accidents, Mr. Green had already been involved in enough 
preventable accidents to sustain a decision by the UTA to 
terminate him. At that point in time the UTA was free to impose 
any condition to his continued employment it wished, no matter 
how onerous. Assume that after being involved in three 
preventable accidents the UTA offered Mr. Green the opportunity 
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to keep his employment but only if he were to agree to drive a 
bus at a wage rate of $1 per day. If Mr. Green were to reject 
that option and was then fired (and ignoring any minimum wage law 
implications) is there any doubt that the Court would reject an 
argument that he should have accepted the offer in order to 
preserve his employment while looking for other employment? This 
writer thinks not. Thus, the question reverts to the 
reasonableness of the request that Mr. Green commit to not be 
invo.lved in any more accidents in order to keep his job. 
Other factors advanced by the Board in support of its 
argument that the record as a whole shows that Mr. Green was only 
asked to commit to noninvolvement in preventable accidents are 
also without merit. The Board points out that in his appeal from 
the Administrative Law Judge's decision/ Mr. Green stated/ "It is 
against my moral value to sign a document stating that I will not 
have another preventable accident . . .."/ and argues that the 
statement exhibits an awareness that Mr. Green was only asked to 
commit to having no more preventable accidents. Obviously/ that 
statement in his appeal came after he had read the Administrative 
Law Judge's findings. The statement is irrelevant to a 
determination of Mr. Green's state of mind when asked to make a 
commitment. 
The introduction into evidence at the administrative 
hearing of a written commitment to avoid preventable accidents 
signed by another driver is also irrelevant to Mr. Green's 
understanding of the condition sought to be imposed. Mr. Green 
testified that he never saw a commitment reduced to writing 
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(R.58) and the UTA!s representative admitted that a commitment 
for Mr. Green's signature was not reduced to writing. (R.57) 
Finally, the Board argues at page 24 of its brief, that 
had Mr. Green signed a commitment then had another accident, an 
investigation of the accident would have been submitted to the 
Accident Review Corraittee and no action taken against him if it 
were determined to have been unpreventable. The argument is 
completely speculative with no basis in the record. 
In sum, the record clearly reveals that Mr. Green was 
terminated. It is respectfully submitted that the condition 
which the UTA sought to impose on Mr. Green was not the arguably 
reasonable request that he avoid further preventable accidents. 
1 .stead, as testified to by Ms. McCall (R.51), Mr. Green was 
asked to make an unreasonable commitment that he "not have any 
more accidents", thus leaving his prospects for continued 
employment at the peril of every other driver on the road. If 
Mr. Green is to be denied benefits, the denial must be based on a 
finding that he was terminated for "just cause" as that term is 
used in Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(1). 
B. 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT MR. GREEN'S 
DRIVING RECORD PROVIDED "JUST CAUSE" FOR 
HIS TERMINATION 
In Point IV of its brief, the Board appears to 
acknowledge that Continental Oil Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. 
Comm., Utah, 568 P.2d 727 (1977), would be controlling absent 
subsequent statutory amendments. In Continental Oil this court 
held that, under the facts there presented, an employee 
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terminated from his employment solely on the basis of his driving 
record could not be denied benefits on the ground that the 
termination was for misconduct. The Board aptly points out that 
Continental Oil was decided prior to the 1983 addition of the 
phrase "for just cause" in Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(1). The 
Board does acknowledge that "just cause" for discharging an 
employee requires that there be "some fault on the part of the 
employee involved". Department of Employment Security Rules and 
Regulations, Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(II)-l.A.2. The Board, 
however, makes the unwarranted assumption that the UTA's 
determination that Mr. Green's accidents were "preventable" 
necessarily means that Mr. Green was at fault, as the word 
"fault" is used in the Department's Proposed Rules. 
There is no evidence in the record that before the UTA 
determines an accident to be "preventable" it must find that the 
involved driver was "negligent" as that term is applied in tort 
law* To the contrary, when a UTA bus operator is involved in an 
accident the UTA Accident Review Committee makes "a determination 
of whether the accident was due to operator error or whether it 
was just something that the operator could have done nothing to 
avoid". (R.48)(emphasis added) Or, as found by the 
Administrative Law Judge, the committee "makes a determination as 
to whether the accident was preventable by the driver, or 
1. Negligence is, of course, the failure to do what a 
reasonable and prudent person would have done under the 
circumstances. West Union Canal Co. v. Provo Bench Canal & 
Irrigation Co., 116 Utah 128, 208 P.2d 1119 (1949). 
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completely beyond the driver's control", (R.40)(emphasis added) 
Thus, it appears that "preventable" as used by the UTA 
when evaluating bus accidents, is lower on a scale of relative 
culpability than is "negligence". On the other hand, "fault", as 
determined with reference to the Proposed Rules, is higher on a 
culpability scale than "negligence". Proposed Rule 
A71-07-l:5(II)-l.A.5. states, 
"5. Fault may not be established when the reason for 
discharge is based on such things as mere mistakes, 
inefficiency, failure of performance as the result of 
inability or incapacity, inadvertence in isolated 
instances, good-faith errors in judgment or in the 
exercise of discretion, minor but casual or 
unintentional carelessness or negligence, etc. These 
examples are not disqualifying because of the lack of 
knowledge or control. . .." (emphasis added) 
Thus, in determining fault the Proposed Rules adopt 
standards very similar to those set forth in Continental Oil Co., 
supra, and Martin v. Department of Employment Security, Utah, 682 
P.2d 304 (1984). 
Without evidence as to the particulars of Mr. Green's 
accidents, the Board's evaluation (Respondents' Brief, pages 
26-29) of culpability, knowledge and control, the three elements 
of "fault" as that term is used in the Proposed Rules, is of 
little or no help. All that can be determined from the record is 
that Mr. Green's accidents were "preventable", i.e., not 
completely beyond the driver's control. (R.40) 
After Mr. Green was initially granted unemployment 
benefits (R.40), it was the employer's burden at the 
administrative hearing to establish "just cause". Proposed Rule 
A71-07-l:5(II)-l.B.l., quoted at page 7 of Respondents' Brief. 
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Given the facts that were placed into the record in this case/ a 
finding of "fault" and thus "just cause" for Mr. Green's 
termination can only be reached if the Proposed Rule quoted above 
is completely ignored. 
It should also be noted that the above-quoted Proposed 
Rule contemplates that plural instances of inadvertance or 
good-faith errors in judgment will not necessarily be 
disqualifying. The Board's characterization (Respondents' Brief, 
page 27) of Mr. Green's driving record as involving "repeated 
incidents of preventable accidents" is harsh, even if technically 
correct. Mr. Green was involved in a "minor" accident on January 
14, 1984. 360 days later, on January 8, 1985, he was involved in 
two more "minor1' accidents. 
When driving his route/ Mr. Green was faced with 
competing interests similar to those of the employee in Martin v. 
Department of Employment Security/ supra/ 682 P.2d 304, discussed 
in Respondents' Brief at pages 30-31. Here, Mr. Green was 
disciplined for being involved in preventable accidents which he 
testified occured on icy roads. Mr. Green could also have been 
disciplined for not meeting his bus route schedule, absent valid 
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reason for delay. Given such competing job performance 
obligations, it is not surprising that occasional "preventable" 
accidents occur during winter weather. 
2. Admittedly/ the UTA Policies and Procedure Manual for Coach 
Operators/ on which plaintiff bases his assertion/ is not a part 
of the record. 
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Finally/ the Board attempts to distinguish the 
Continental Oil Co, case by pointing out that the employee in 
that case/ after being involved in the accident which 
precipitated his termination/ was acquitted of a charge of 
driving under the influence of alcohol. On the other hand/ there 
was a determination in the instant case that Mr. Green1s 
accidents were preventable. The different burden of proof in the 
Continental Oil Co. employee's criminal case renders the 
distinction null. 
C. 
MR. GREEN'S FAILURE TO FILE A UNION GRIEVANCE 
IS IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUES HEREIN 
At various places in its brief/ the Board of Review 
points out that Mr. Green failed to grieve his termination 
through his u.ion. His failure to contest the termination is 
irrelevant. The issue in this case is not whether Mr. Green was 
discharged in violation of his union's contract/ or whether he 
might have a civil cause of action for wrongful discharge. 
Instead/ the issue is whether he was discharged for reasons that 
disqualify him from unemployment benefits. The Board presents no 
authority for the proposition that Mr. Green was required to 
exhaust his remedies for continued employment through a union 
grievance before he could qualify for unemployment benefits. 
Indeed/ no such authority can be found. 
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II. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff James Green respectfully submits that this 
Court should enter its order reversing the decision of the Board 
of Review and remand the matter to the Industrial Commission with 
directions to enter an order declaring plaintiff eligible for 
unemployment benefits and reinstating benefits in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-3. /^// fa CAMP* 
Dated this J/'" day of November", 1985. 
Steven H. Lybbfert 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
James Green 
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Steven H.^Lybbert 
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